Financial institutions have been at the forefront of the debate on the controversial shift in international standards from historical cost accounting to mark-to-market accounting. We show that the tradeoffs at stake in this debate are far from onesided. While the excessive conservatism in the historical cost regime leads to some inefficiencies, marking to market may lead to other types of inefficiencies by injecting artificial volatility that degrades the information value of prices, and induces suboptimal real decisions. We construct a framework that can weigh the pros and cons. We find that the damage done by marking to market is greatest when claims are (i) long-lived, (ii) illiquid, and (iii) senior. These are precisely the attributes of the key balance sheet items of banks and insurance companies. Our results therefore shed light on why banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal opponents of the shift to marking to market.
Introduction
Accounting is often seen as a veil -as a mere detail of measurement -leaving the economic fundamentals unaffected. However, the intensity of the public debate surrounding accounting reforms in recent years suggests that there may be more at stake than esoteric debates on measurement.
The immediate cause of the recent debate has been the initiative of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the U. S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) toward convergence of accounting standards to a global one based on the information that is provided by prevailing market prices -sometimes known as a "fair value" or "markto-market" reporting system. This is in contrast to measurement systems based on historical cost which require firms to record their assets and liabilities at their original prices with no adjustments for subsequent changes in the market values of those items.
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Proponents of marking to market argue that the market value of an asset is more relevant than historical cost because it reflects the amount at which that asset could be bought or sold in a current transaction between willing parties. Similarly, the market value of a liability is more relevant than historical cost because it reflects the amount at which that liability could be incurred or settled in a current transaction between willing parties. A measurement system that reflects the market values of assets and liabilities would therefore lead to better insights into the risk profile of firms currently in place so that investors could exercise better market discipline and corrective action on firm's decisions.
Such an argument would be overwhelming in the context of completely frictionless markets where market prices fully reflect the fundamental values of all assets and liabilities.
The benchmark efficiency properties of competitive equilibria could then be invoked, and no further argument would be necessary. However, when there are imperfections in the market, the superiority of a mark-to-market regime is no longer so immediate. The relevant analogy here is with the theory of the second best from welfare economics. When there is more than one imperfection in a competitive economy, removing just one of these imperfections need not be welfare-improving. It is possible that the removal of one of the imperfections magni-fies the negative effects of the other imperfections to the detriment of overall welfare. Thus, simply moving to a mark-to-market regime without addressing the other imperfections in the financial system need not guarantee a welfare improvement. In some cases, the market price may not be the "true and fair" value of the asset.
Our paper is an attempt to shed light on how the second-best perspective can be brought to bear on the debate on optimal accounting standards, and to provide a framework of analysis that can weigh up the arguments on both sides. Indeed, as we will argue below, issues of measurement have a far reaching influence on the behavior of financial institutions, and determine to a large extent the efficiency of the price mechanism in guiding real decisions.
Accounting ceases to be just a veil if real economic decisions are influenced by how quantities are measured and disclosed. In a world where informational frictions limit the scope for arms-length contractual relationships, accounting numbers serve an important certification role. They are audited numbers that carry quasi-legal connotations that can serve as the publicly verifiable quantities on which to base contracts, including the compensation contracts for managers. As such, accounting numbers serve as a justification for actions.
If decisions are made not only because you believe that the underlying fundamentals are right, but because the accounts give you the external validation to take such decisions, then the accounting numbers take on great significance.
A key dimension to the debate is the extent to which mark-to-market accounting injects excessive volatility into financial markets. It is important here to distinguish volatility of market prices that merely reflects the volatility of fundamentals from volatility that cannot be justified by these fundamentals. If the fundamentals themselves are volatile, then market prices reflect genuine risk. However, the excessive or "artificial" nature of volatility refers to something more pernicious. Market prices play a double-edged role. Not only are they a reflection of the underlying fundamentals, but they also affect the market outcome through their influence on the actions of market participants. When the decision horizon of market participants are shortened, for instance due to agency problems or other market imperfections, then short-term price fluctuations affect the payoffs of these players in a mark-to-market regime, and hence will influence their actions. There is then the possibility of a feedback loop where anticipation of short-term price movements will induce market participants to act in such as a way as to amplify these price movements. When such feedback effects are strong, then firms' decisions are based on the second-guessing of others' decisions rather than on the basis of perceived fundamentals. In this sense, there is the danger of the emergence of an additional, endogenous source of volatility that is purely a consequence of the accounting norm, rather than something that reflects the underlying fundamentals. Understanding the nature and severity of such effects will be one of the key tasks in our paper.
In spite of the practical importance of the issue, there has been surprisingly little theoretical work on the economic trade-offs of mark-to-market versus historical cost measurement policies.
2 Our paper is an attempt to redress this balance. We develop a parsimonious model that compares the real effects of a historical cost and mark-to-market measurement regime.
The fundamental trade-off can be described as follows. The historical cost regime relies on past prices, and so accounting values are insensitive to price signals under this regime.
This leads to one type of inefficiency arising from excessive conservatism. Marking to market overcomes this conservatism by extracting the information conveyed by market prices, but it also distorts this information. When the decision horizons are shortened due to agency problems, the anticipation of future prices affects firms' decisions which, in turn, injects artificial volatility into prices. Knowing all this, the firms become even more sensitive to short-term price movements. These effects are broadly in line with the informal arguments of practitioners, and lead to clear economic trade-offs between the two measurement regimes.
Our model generates the following three main implications:
1. The longer the duration of the asset, the more vulnerable the asset is to artificial volatility. In particular, for sufficiently long-lived assets, a historical cost regime is superior to a mark-to-market regime. Conversely, for shorter-lived assets, a mark-tomarket regime dominates a historical cost regime.
2. The more illiquid the market for the asset, the more vulnerable the asset is to artificial 2 There are some notable exceptions. O'Hara (1993) investigates the effect of market value accounting on loan maturity and finds that mark-to-market results in a preference for short-term loans over long-term loans. In contemporaneous work, Strausz (2004) posits that marking to market should mitigate information asymmetry, and derives its impact on banks' liquidity. Freixas and Tsomocos (2004) notes that the inferior intertemporal smoothing properties of marking to market should be detrimental to banks. Our analysis builds upon quite different premises, and is therefore unrelated to these contributions. volatility. For those assets whose markets have a limited absorption capacity for sales, a historical cost regime is superior to a mark-to-market regime. Conversely, for those assets with sufficiently deep and liquid markets, mark-to-market is preferable.
3. The more senior the asset, the more vulnerable the asset is to artificial volatility.
Senior claims that have limited upside but a large possible downside risk are the most susceptible to artificial volatility in the mark-to-market regime. Junior claims with a large potential upside but limited downside are more plagued by the conservatism of the historical cost regime.
We believe that our results shed some light on why the opposition to marking to market has been led by the banking and insurance industries. For these financial institutions a large proportion of their balance sheets consists precisely of items that are long duration, illiquid and senior. For banks, these items appear on the asset side of their balance sheets.
Loans, typically, are senior, long-term and very illiquid. For insurance companies, the focus is on the liabilities side of their balance sheet. Insurance liabilities are long-term, illiquid and have limited upside from the point of view of the insurance company.
Our modelling approach is to keep the details to a bare minimum, but with just enough richness to capture these effects. Our model studies financial institutions that have acquired an asset in a primary market and face the decision whether to hold it until maturity or offload it in a secondary market, such as the securitization market or the reinsurance market.
There are three ingredients that make such a decision problematic. First, the horizon of firms does not match the duration of their assets. Second, the true value of the asset cannot be contracted upon. Instead, the value of the firm can be measured only with the prices of its assets, either the past price (historical cost regime) or the current price (mark-to-market regime). Third, the secondary market for the asset is illiquid. There is limited absorption capacity for sales. The limited capacity of the market to absorb sales of assets has figured prominently in the literature on banking and financial crises (see for example Allen and Gale (2001) and Gorton and Huang (2003) ). Also, the buyers in the secondary market are not able to extract the same full value as the originators-the specific skills of financial intermediaries are an important ingredient, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000) .
Under the historical cost regime, short-horizon firms find it optimal to sell assets that have recently appreciated in value, since booking them at historical cost understates their worth. Despite a discount in the secondary market, the inertia in accounting values gives these short horizon firms the incentives to sell. Thus, the historical cost regime leads to excess conservatism-firms have no incentives to exert their skills when it is the most valuable.
A natural remedy to this excess conservatism would be to shift to a mark-to-market regime. This is only an imperfect solution, however. The illiquidity of the secondary market causes another type of inefficiency. A bad outcome for the asset will depress fundamental values somewhat, but the more pernicious effect comes from the negative externalities generated by other firms selling. When others sell, short-term prices are depressed more than is justified by the fundamentals, and exerts a negative effect on all others, but especially on those who have chosen to hold on to the asset. Anticipating this negative outcome, a short-horizon firm will be tempted to preempt the fall in price by selling the asset itself.
However, such preemptive action will merely serve to amplify the price fall. In this way, the mark-to-market regime generates endogenous volatility of prices that impede the resource allocation role of prices. Using global game techniques, we can characterize such artificial volatility as a function of the underlying fundamentals. In general, marking to market tends to amplify the movements in asset prices relative to their fundamental values in bad states of the world. The mark-to-market regime leads to inefficient sales in bad times, but the historical cost regime turns out to be particularly inefficient in good times. This is why the seniority of the asset's payoff (which determines the concavity of the payoff function) and the skewness of the distribution of the future cash flows have an important impact on the choice of the optimal regime.
As the duration of assets increase, both regimes become more inefficient. However, the historical cost regime exhibits less inefficiency relative to the mark-to-market regime. This is because the negative externality exerted by other sellers becomes more severe when the duration of the asset increases, and the firms' actions are influenced more by the secondguessing of other firms' decisions.
Our model highlights some key factors in the strategic interactions between firms in the secondary market. Under the historical cost regime, actions of the firms are strategic substitutes. Sales by the other firms drive the market price down, which makes holding the asset booked at the acquisition cost more desirable. Conversely, in the mark-to-market regime, firms' actions are strategic complements. The expectation of sales by the other firms makes holding the asset less desirable because of an expected low market value at the reporting date. Strategic substitutability has a stabilizing effect, so that the market price is "artificially smooth" as compared to the true value of the asset under the historical cost measurement regime. Strategic complementarity adds endogenous volatility, so that the market prices are "artificially volatile" as compared to the fundamental values in a markedto-market economy. In extreme cases, the endogenously generated market distress can lead to "liquidity black holes" (Morris and Shin (2004) ).
These strategic effects give a pivotal role to the liquidity of the secondary market. In more illiquid markets, strategic concerns become more important. As the market becomes more illiquid, strategic complementarity increases in the mark-to-market regime, leading to greater incidence of sales and more volatile prices. In the historical cost regime, increasing illiquidity has a disciplining effect on firms because of increased strategic substitutability, and may therefore be Pareto improving for some values of the parameters.
To date, a thorough-going approach to marking to market has affected only a small segment of the financial sector -notably, hedge funds and other hedge fund-like institutions that deal mainly with marketable claims. Marking to market has been limited by the lack of reliable prices in deep and liquid markets for many assets. Loans, for instance, have not been traded in large enough quantities to mark the loan book to market in a reliable way.
However, all this is about to change. The advent of deep markets in credit derivatives has removed the practical barriers to marking loans to market. The price of a credit default swap can be used to price a "notional" loan corresponding to the standardised characteristics of such a loan, much like the price of a futures contract on a bond, which indicates the price of a notional bond. Feasibility is no longer a hurdle to a thorough-going application of marking to market (or will not remain a hurdle for long).
It can be argued that mark-to-market accounting has already had a far-reaching impact on the conduct of market participants through those institutions that deal mainly with tradeable securities, such as hedge funds and the proprietary trading desks of investment banks. However, even these developments will pale into insignificance to the potential impact of the marking to market of loans and other previously illiquid assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model in which we show that the choice of an accounting measurement policy-mark-to-market versus historical cost-is not neutral. We find that both measurement regimes have important real effects in line with those conjectured by practitioners. Section 3 introduces global game techniques to reduce the number of equilibria in this simple model. Section 4 studies the impact of asset duration and liquidity on asset prices in each measurement regime. Section 5 carries out a welfare analysis. Section 6 concludes. Section 7 contains proofs of the major propositions.
The Basic Model
Our model centers on the decision of the manager of a financial institution such as a bank or an insurance company. The manager aims at maximizing the interim earnings of the institution. There is a large empirical literature documenting the extensive use of accounting earnings as a basis for executive compensation, especially in the financial services industry. This literature finds that managerial compensation is more closely tied to the firm's accounting earnings than to its stock returns and that accounting earnings are a significant determinant of managerial compensation even when stock returns are also included as an explanatory variable (see Lambert and Larcker (1987) , Jensen and Murphy (1990) , and Sloan (1992)).
Several theoretical papers have explained this phenomenon by showing that a firm's security price is not an optimal aggregator of information for the firm's principal agent problem. Therefore, in an efficient market, even though accounting earnings are superfluous for valuation purposes given security prices, accounting earnings are not superfluous for contracting purposes (see Paul (1992) , Bushman and Indjejikian (1993) ). In this paper, we do not derive the optimal compensation contract of the bank's manager. We take as given the empirical fact that earnings play a rather important role in determining a manager's compensation: we assume that the manager maximizes earnings. In order to maximize expected earnings, the manager decides whether to off-load a given risk or to carry this risk, and therefore measure it in accordance with the prevailing accounting standard. The nature of the accounting standard will impact the decision of the manager. In equilibrium, managerial decisions, in turn, impact the market pricing of this risk. One interpretation of our stylized model is that of a commercial bank that is contemplating either the securitization of a loan or hedging the underlying risk of the loan in the credit derivative market. An alternative interpretation is that the financial institution is an insurance company contemplating ceding outstanding liabilities in the reinsurance market.
Building on the themes laid out above, we now describe our model in more detail. There are three dates in our model, indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, 2}. There is a continuum of ex ante identical financial institutions (FIs) with unit mass. At date 0, each FI holds a long-lived asset generating a single future cash flow. This asset has been acquired in the past at a cost v 0 determined outside the model. At date 0, the future cash flow generated by each asset, or asset fundamental, is known to all the FIs and equal to v. However, there is uncertainty about the date at which each asset pays off. An asset may pay off either at date 1, with probability 1 − d, or at date 2, with probability d. We interpret d as a measure of the duration of the asset.
The FIs are run by risk neutral managers whose horizons are shorter than the durations of the long-lived assets: each manager aims to maximize the expected date-1 earnings of the FI by maximizing the expected date-1 accounting value of the asset. The accounting value of the asset, in turn, depends on the prevailing accounting regime. The main friction of this economy is that the future cash flow v is non-contractible, and cannot be used in arriving at the accounting value. Instead, there are two available measures of v-the market price p, or the historical cost v 0 . In the case of a historical cost measurement regime, the estimate of v is given by its acquisition cost v 0 . Under a mark-to-market regime, the estimate of v is its market price at the date of the valuation. The market price p of the asset is given by p = δv − γs where δ is a positive constant less than 1, s is the proportion of financial institutions who sell the asset, and γ is a positive constant. The secondary market price p may diverge from v for two reasons. First, the discount factor δ captures the fact that the counterparts of the FIs have less skills in extracting the cash flows generated by the assets than the FIs originating the assets. Second, the price p depends on how many of the financial institutions sell the asset. The parameter γ is interpreted as a measure of the illiquidity of the asset.
When γ = 0, the market for the asset is infinitely deep so that the price of the asset does not depend on aggregate sale s. When γ > 0, the market price is sensitive to aggregate sales. The larger γ is, the more illiquid the market for the asset, and the more sensitive is the price p to the fraction s of FIs selling the asset.
By means of our two parameters δ and γ, we capture the feature that when banks securitize their outstanding claims, they place them in a decentralized over-the-counter market, with institutional investors such as life insurance companies or pension funds. These institutional investors have a limited absorption capacity (captured by γ > 0) because they are subject to diversification and asset-liability management constraints, and have lower monitoring skills (captured by δ < 1) because they do not enter into a banking relationship with the originator of the claim. 4 The limited liquidity of the secondary market has also figured recently in the literature on financial market runs (see, e.g., Bernardo and Welch (2004) , or Morris and Shin (2004) ).
At date 0, each FI must decide whether to sell its asset in the secondary market or hold it until date 1. If the FI holds the asset, its value is booked in accordance with the prevailing accounting regime. Under the historical cost regime, the asset is booked at historical cost v 0 . Under the mark-to-market regime, it is booked at market price p. We have set up the model in such a way that selling the asset occurs for windowdressing reasons only and asset sales are therefore always inefficient in our environment.
Such inefficient sales reduce the surplus of FIs. We, of course, do not want to imply that securitization or reinsurance is not desirable in general. We do not model efficient sales for genuine risk-management purposes only because such sales do not depend on the accounting measurement regime by definition, and would therefore be immaterial for the purpose of this paper. Focusing on inefficient sales allows us to obtain sharper insights on the real effects of imperfect measurement regimes.
Each measurement regime induces significant real effects by affecting the decisions of the FIs to hold or off-load the asset at date 0. We carry out this analysis under the assumption
and d + δ > 1, namely when assets are sufficiently long-lived and not too specific.
Let ∆ HC denote the differential expected value of carrying the asset versus selling it for a given FI under the historical-cost regime. Conditional on expecting that a fraction s of other FIs will liquidate the asset,
Similarly, denoting ∆ MM the same differential expected value under a mark-to-market measurement,
The following proposition is a straightforward consequence of these inequalities:
Proposition 1 Under the historical-cost measurement regime, there is a unique equilibrium in which:
• FIs hold their assets if v < • Otherwise, they sell with a probability π = 2 γ
Under the mark-to-market measurement regime:
• If v < 0, there is a unique equilibrium in which FIs sell their assets.
•
, there is a unique equilibrium in which FIs hold their assets.
• Otherwise, there are two pure-strategy equilibria, one in which all FIs sell their assets, one in which all FIs hold their assets.
Historical-cost measurement has the unfortunate consequence that FIs are too conservative, because their books do not reflect sufficiently quickly the appreciated value of their assets. This accounting norm prevents a smooth transfer of wealth across dates because it does not make use of price signals. As a result, FIs do not carry out the most profitable projects whose horizons exceed their tenure. Instead, they find it preferable to realize a lower gain in the short run by selling their assets. Unfortunately, switching to a mark-to-market system is only an imperfect remedy to this myopia. By trying to extract the informational content of prices, the mark-to-market regime actually distorts this content. Marking to market may create "beauty contests" in which FIs become concerned to off-load their assets due to the concern that they expect that others will do so.
Under the historical cost measurement regime, sales are strategic substitutes. If a FI believes that other FIs will sell, she finds holding the asset more valuable. This strategic substitutability is a stabilizing phenomenon leading to a unique price. Conversely, under the mark-to-market regime, sales are strategic complements: sales by other FIs make the sale of the asset more appealing. This strategic complementarity adds a source of endogenous risk in the economy. This endogenous risk has nothing to do with the fundamental volatility of the asset and is an unfortunate consequence of the mark-to-market regime. Thus, a social planner who has to opt for one of these two measurement regimes is caught between the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, historical cost makes too little use of the information contained in the prices on the asset market and relies too heavily on the out-dated historical cost, v 0 . On the other hand, in trying to extract the informational content of prices, marking to market distorts this information by adding endogenous risk. ), the markto-market regime implements the first-best allocation under which none of the FIs sell their assets. This is because the negative externality that the FIs that sell their assets create for the FIs that hold their assets is dγs which is smaller than γ s 2 , the negative externality that the selling FIs create for themselves. In this case, "runs" do not occur in equilibrium for nonnegative values of v. Thus, at this stage, our model already suggests that absent an important mismatch between the horizon of firms and the duration of assets, a mark-tomarket measurement regime is unambiguously preferable to a historical cost measurement regime.
An immediate implication of Proposition 1 is that the mark-to-market regime creates this additional endogenous risk only if the asset is sufficiently long-lived (d >
Note also that marking to market at the average price observed between dates 0 and 1
) instead of the actual price that the marginal seller gets at date 1 (namely δv −s) removes this risk of self-fulfilling "runs". This result is in line with the fact that some practitioners view the valuation of assets at the average price observed during the reporting period as a good compromise between the current historical cost regime and regulatory proposals of valuing the asset at its price at the end of the reporting period. However, it is still not clear whether this solution would be robust in a more dynamic model. If information about the fundamental v arrived dynamically between dates 0 and 1, this solution would create the perverse incentives of the historical cost regime whereby a FI would be tempted to sell her asset in order to realize quick gains in case of good news.
Further comparison between the regimes requires that the endogenous risk under the mark-to-market regime be quantified. The multiplicity of equilibria makes this difficult.
In the next section, we assume that FIs do not observe v perfectly at date 0. Rather, when deciding whether to sell or hold the asset, each FI observes a noisy version of the fundamental v. Using global games techniques, we obtain unique equilibrium outcomes.
The Global Game
We will now apply techniques from the theory of global games to arrive at unique equilibrium outcomes. 5 The only modification to the game outlined so far is to introduce some idiosyncratic, possibly arbitrarily small noise in the information set of FIs so that common knowledge of fundamentals no longer holds. More precisely, suppose that the payoff of the asset v admits a prior density f (.), which is continuous and has a connected support. We also let F (.) denote the c.d.f. of v.
The financial institutions do not observe v immediately when realized at date 0, but only later on when the market clears. Instead, at date 0, when facing the decision to hold or offload the asset, each FI i observes the noisy signal x i = v+ε i . The noise term ε i is distributed uniformly on the interval [−η, η], and these noise terms are independent across FIs. We will be particularly interested in the limiting case of our framework in which η → 0 so that the noise becomes negligible in the limit. In this framework, a (symmetric) equilibrium is characterized by a strategy s(x) mapping a signal x into a probability s(x) to sell the asset.
We will characterize the equilibrium outcomes in this limiting case in the two accounting regimes-mark-to-market and historical cost. We begin with the mark-to-market case.
Equilibrium in the Mark-to-Market Regime
In the mark-to-market regime, our setup is a particular case of the global game solved in Frankel, Morris, and Pauzner (2003) or Morris and Shin (2003) , in which the payoff is a linear function of the fundamental v. Thus, their results can be readily applied:
Proposition 2 In the limit as η → 0, there is a unique dominance solvable equilibrium under the mark-to-market regime. In this equilibrium,
s (x) = 1 otherwise.
In words, in the limit, FIs sell their assets if and only if their signal is below the cutoff value
. 5 The theory of global games has been introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , and Morris and Shin (1998) popularized its applications.
To offer some intuition for this result, we will show with a simple argument that there is a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies as η → 0. A threshold strategy consists in selling the asset if and only if the signal is below some cutoff value b
x. To demonstrate this result, let us begin by showing that the strategic uncertainty-the uncertainty over the actions of other players-can be pinned down precisely in the limit as η → 0.
Lemma 1 Suppose that all FIs follow the threshold strategy around b x. Then, conditional on receiving a signal equal to the threshold point, the density over the proportion of FIs that sell the asset is given by the uniform density in the limit as η → 0.
When v is the true state, each signal is distributed uniformly in the interval
By the law of large numbers, when the threshold point b x lies in this interval, the proportion of firms that sell the asset is thus given by:
This proportion is exactly equal to some constant z when
Denote the value of v that satisfies this relation by b v. Thus,
Whenever the true state v is greater than or equal to b v, then the proportion of firms that sell the asset is less than or equal to z. Thus, the probability that the proportion of firms that sell the asset is less than or equal to z is given by the probability that the true state v is greater than or equal to b v. Thus, the cumulative distribution function G (z) over the proportion of firms that sell the asset evaluated at the point z is given by the probability that the true state v is above b v.
Consider the conditional density over the true state v conditional on a signal equal to b x.
Since the noise term ε i has bounded support in [−η, η], the posterior density over the true
. Since the prior density over v was assumed to be continuous, the posterior density reaches a minimum m (η) and a maximum M (η) on this interval, such that:
Conditional on being at the threshold point b x, the probability that v ≥ b v is given by the area under the posterior density over v to the right of b v. This area will give us G (z).
From the definition of m and M, we thus have the pair of inequalities:
Thus, we conclude that in the limit:
In other words, the cumulative distribution function over the proportion of firms that sell the asset tends to the identity function. In turn, this implies that the density function over the proportion of firms that sell tends to the uniform density. QED
The characterization of the threshold point in the mark-to-market regime is then obtained as the indifference point of a firm when it hypothesizes that the density over the proportion of firms that sell is given by the uniform density (so that the expected proportion of firms that sell is given by 1/2). This gives the cutoff value in Proposition 2.
Equilibrium in the Historical-Cost Regime
In the historical-cost regime, the complete information game has a unique equilibrium. Thus, it is easy to see that the introduction of an arbitrarily small noise in the fundamentals has essentially no effect on the equilibrium of the complete information game. Formally, note that the distribution of v conditional on a signal x i tends to a Dirac delta function in x i as η → 0. Thus, any equilibrium strategy of the incomplete information game, s η (.), must be such that s η (x i ) tends to an equilibrium strategy in the complete information game with payoff x i as η → 0. But since, unlike in the mark-to-market case, there is only one such strategy for each value x i in the complete information game, it must be that s η (.) converges pointwise to this strategy:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the firms are operating under the historical-cost regime. Then, there is a unique equilibrium in the limit as η → 0. In this equilibrium,
otherwise.
In words, the equilibria of the incomplete information game converge to the unique equilibrium of the complete information game.
We will now investigate the implications of these equilibria on both the price and the allocation of the asset under each measurement regime.
Real Effects of Measurement Regimes
Because of myopia, the measurement frictions that we have assumed have a real impact.
In the following sections, we show that the impact of measurement issues on prices and quantities is very sensitive to the nature of the accounting regime. We first study the consequences of the measurement regime on the distribution of the market price of the asset. Next, we investigate its impact on the allocation of the asset.
Measurement Regime and Informational Efficiency
Let p(v) denote the average price at which the asset trades between t = 0 and t = 1 conditional on v. Substituting the equilibrium proportion, s(v), of FIs off-loading the asset conditional on a realization v of the fundamental value in p(v) = δv − γ
, it is straightforward to verify that under the historical-cost accounting regime, the average market price of the asset, p HC (v), is:
Similarly, under the mark-to-market accounting regime, the average market price of the asset, p MM (v), is: In the mark-to-market regime, the price of the asset is a discontinuous function of the
. Strategic complementarity adds endogenous volatility to the price of the asset.
The resulting single-crossing property of the price functions p MM (v) and p HC (v) illustrated in Figure 1 implies that p MM (v) is riskier than p HC (v) in the sense that its distribution has more weight in the tails than the distribution of p HC (v).
The differential impact of each measurement regime on the pricing of the asset sheds some light on the arguments of each side in the current debate on accounting standards. Financial institutions have argued against marking to market on the grounds that a mark-to-market measurement regime would add undesirable artificial volatility to their reported numbers, while supporters of full fair value have argued that historical cost conceals real volatility. At the firm level, and for an exogenous price process, marking to market mechanically imports volatility on the firm's balance sheet, simply because its books are updated more frequently.
Our model suggests that this mechanical effect, in turn, impacts firms' trading behavior, thereby modifying the state prices, and further injecting additional volatility in the market for the asset. We obtain that historical cost accounting generates counter-cyclical trades that smooth the fundamental volatility of the asset, whereas in the mark-to-market regime, the feedback of measurement on pricing is pro-cyclical and increases fundamental volatility.
Thus, not only do measurement regimes misrepresent the fundamental value of assets, but they also impact asset prices, which, in turn, create additional measurement problems. The amplification mechanism caused by this interaction between measuring and pricing may explain why the "artificial" versus "fundamental" nature of market price volatility is at the heart of the debate on fair value accounting.
Measurement Regime and Allocative Efficiency
Each measurement regime affects not only prices, but also quantities traded in very different ways. Sales of assets for window-dressing purposes reduce the surplus that FIs could create for their claimholders by holding the assets. In this section, we compare the losses for the claimholders of the FIs under each regime. Formally, the aggregate loss for a given value of v, L(v), is given by the aggregate reduction in long term earnings due to asset sales:
where s(v) is the (deterministic) proportion of FIs selling for a given payoff v, and p(v) is the price of the asset for each realized value of v derived in the former section. This simple form stems from the linearity of the demand curve.
Let L HC (v) and L MM (v) denote the respective loss functions for a realization v of the expected payoff under the historical-cost and mark-to-market regimes respectively. Using the expressions for p(v) and s(v) derived above, it is straightforward to show that: 
Nature of Claim and Surplus
An inspection of Figure 2 delivers immediately the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Marking to market is preferable for assets whose payoff's distribution has a sufficiently fat right tail and a sufficiently thin left tail. Conversely, the historical cost regime is preferable for assets whose payoff's distribution has a sufficiently fat left tail and a sufficiently thin right tail.
The risk profile of financial institutions' assets-typically senior loans, and insurance liabilities involve a large potential downside and a more limited potential upside. Lemma 2 suggests that banks' assets and insurers' liabilities are typically the class of claims for which historical cost is likely to dominate mark-to-market in our environment. This result may therefore explain why banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal opponents of marking-to-market.
Lemma 2 also sheds some light on the political economy of the FASB and IASB reform. We will now investigate how the ex ante respective losses in the historical cost and markto-market measurement regimes, E(L HC (v)) and E(L MM (v)) respectively, vary with d, the asset's duration and γ, the asset's liquidity. Recall we assumed that v has a continuous density f (.) and cumulative density F (.).
Duration and Surplus
Proposition 4 The expected losses E( e L MM ) and E( e L HC ) in the mark-to-market and historicalcost regimes both increase in d, the asset duration. Furthermore, all else equal, there exists
Proof. See Appendix.
In words, under both measurement regimes, measurement frictions have more detrimental consequences for longer-lived assets than shorter-lived assets: v * , v * decrease w.r.t. d, and v c increases w.r.t. d. But for relatively short-lived assets, the mark-to-market regime is preferable to the historical cost regime, whereas the historical cost regime is preferable for assets that have a sufficiently large duration. In other words, the surplus loss is more sensitive to duration under marking to market. The intuition for these results is the following.
FIs sell when they expect the illiquidity premium to be smaller than the mismeasurement of the cash flows that their assets generate. As the cash flows generated by the asset shift towards the future, other things being equal, misvaluation is more likely, and this misvaluation makes sales more appealing under both regimes. Trading behavior is very sensitive to duration in the mark-to-market regime because the threshold above which holding the asset is dominant goes up from 0 to ∞ as d goes from 0.5 to 1. Thus, other things being equal, the threshold at which a FI is indifferent if 50% of the others sell, v c , also ranges from 0 to ∞ as d goes from 0.5 to 1. Trades are less sensitive to duration under historical-cost accounting because of the inertia inherent to this regime. Even for arbitrarily small values of d, a FI is still willing to realize the value of the asset for large values of v by selling it.
When d = 1, there is still an area to the left of v * > v 0 in which FIs never sell, because the measurement regime provides them with a "hedge". Figure 3 illustrates the implications of Proposition (4) for a specific environment where
Interestingly, this prediction supports the current U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) reporting requirements for assets. Short-lived assets such as short-term investments and inventories are marked to market on the balance sheets while long-lived assets such as property, plant and equipment and long-term investments are not marked to market but measured at historical cost. 
Liquidity and Surplus
Proposition 5 There exists ¡ γ, γ ¢ where 0 < γ ≤ γ such that:
The interplay of market illiquidity, captured by γ, with the measurement regimes is more subtle than that of duration. First, under both measurement regimes, a decrease in liquidity, namely an increase in the price impact of sales γ, has a negative direct impact.
For a fixed number of sales s, the average sale price is lower as γ increases, other things being equal. Another effect of an increase in γ, however, is that strategic concerns become relatively more important than fundamental concerns. As the liquidity of the market dries up, the price p = δv − γs becomes more dependent on the strategies of other FIs. Since different measurement regimes imply dramatic differences in the strategic nature of FIs' interactions, these strategic effects vary substantially across regimes. Because of strategic complementarity, under a mark-tomarket regime, the strategic effect goes in the same direction as the direct effect. Namely, that the other FIs sell makes selling more appealing as γ increases. Thus, coordination is more difficult: the threshold above which FIs hold the asset increases with respect to γ.
Conversely, strategic substitutability introduces congestion effects under historical cost. All else equal, a higher γ has a disciplining effect on FIs. They respond to the higher price impact of sales by selling less often, which goes against the direct effect since it reduces inefficient sales.
More formally, the expected loss in the mark-to-market regime is given by:
Differentiating with respect to γ, yields:
Since v c increases w.r.t. γ, the ex ante welfare loss in the mark-to-market regime increases unambiguously as the liquidity of the asset decreases.
The ex ante welfare loss in the historical cost regime is given by:
Differentiating with respect to γ yields:
The direct effect is positive, the indirect effect is negative. The net effect of liquidity in the historical cost regime is therefore ambiguous. Can the negative effect overwhelm the positive effect so that welfare in the historical cost regime improves as liquidity decreases? Figure 3 shows this is indeed feasible for a specific environment. In this case, illiquidity is overall Pareto-improving in the historical cost regime because the disciplining effect on FIs overcomes the negative direct effect.
These results are again consistent with the fact that the most vocal opponents of mark-tomarket accounting, such as banks and insurance companies, hold vast quantities of relatively illiquid assets and liabilities.
Concluding Remarks
The choice of a measurement regime for financial institutions is one of the most important and contentious current policy issues in the financial services industry. We have developed an economic analysis of this issue. We have modelled an environment in which the only contractible valuations of assets are their prices in an illiquid market. In this environment, measurement policies affect firms' actions, and these actions, in turn, affect prices. Thus, prices drive measurements, but measuring also has a feedback effect on pricing. We compare a measurement regime based on past price-historical cost-with a regime based upon current price-mark-to-market. The historical cost regime is inefficient because it ignores price signals. This leads to excess conservatism. However, in trying to extract the informational content of current prices, the mark-to-market regime damages this content by adding a purely speculative component to price fluctuations. As a result, the choice between these measurement regimes boils down to a dilemma between ignoring price signals, or relying on their degraded versions. We show that the historical cost regime may dominate the mark-to-market regime when assets have a long duration, trade in a very illiquid market, or feature an important downside risk. These results help explain why the application of the regulatory mark-to-market reforms to financial institutions is so contentious. A large proportion of the balance sheets of financial institutions consists precisely of items that are of long duration, illiquid and senior.
Our results also suggest that a careless, rapid shift to a full mark-to-market regime may be detrimental to financial intermediation and therefore to economic growth. This is not to deny that such a transition is a desirable long-run aim. In the long run, large mispricings in relatively illiquid secondary markets would likely trigger financial innovations in order to attract new classes of investors. This enlarged participation would, in turn, enhance liquidity, a situation which our analysis shows that marking to market becomes more efficient. A natural route for future research is to endogenize market participation and thus liquidity in our setup, so as to analyze how a careful transition towards market-based measurements could trade off the costs we have emphasized with the long-run benefits from a higher reliance on price signals.
Proof of Proposition 4. We first show that the ex ante loss increase with the duration of the asset in both regimes. The ex ante surplus loss in the historical cost regime is given by the following expression:
Differentiating the above expression with respect to d, we get:
The ex ante surplus loss in the mark-to-market regime is given by:
Differentiating the above expression with respect to d yields:
We have thus established that the ex ante surplus loss is increasing in the asset duration d for both regimes.
To show the second part of the Proposition, note that v c increases from 0 to +∞ as d goes from 0.5 to 1, while v * and v * both stay in a compact set of R + . Thus, under mark-tomarket, FIs end up selling all the time as d → 1, never as d → 0.5. In the former case, the expected loss is necessarily larger than under historical cost, while it must be smaller in the latter situation.
Proof of Proposition 5. Again, v c grows from 0 to ∞ as γ increases, while v * and v * remain in a compact set.
